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Efrat Arbel and Molly Joeck*
Draft
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Politics of Migration (2021: Edward Elgar Press)
Introduction
The swift global spread of COVID-19 in March 2020 disrupted almost every
aspect of life in Canada, and immigration detention was no exception. In response to
the pandemic, there was an immediate outcry from advocates about the particular
vulnerabilities faced by detainees. The World Health Organization raised the alarm,
warning that “people in prisons and other places of detention” are more vulnerable to
the risk of infection, and that such places “may act as a course of infection
amplification” for the spread of disease.1 Managing COVID-19 within prisons and
places of detention, the World Health Organization cautioned, is a matter of public
health.2 By 19 March 2020, immigration detainees in Canada had presented a petition
for release in the face of the pandemic to government officials.3 Detainees at the Laval
Immigration Center held a hunger strike.4 “We felt abandoned”, one detainee told
Human Rights Watch.5 “We heard about the new measures that were being taken, like
social distancing. But nothing changed for us in detention; it was like those measures
were not meant for us, just for Canadians”.6 Indeed, for the most part, immigration
detainees were unable to engage in social distancing measures or other recommended
measures for minimizing the risk of transmission. In Canada, many immigration
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1
World Health Organization (15 March 2020) ‘Preparedness, prevention and control of COVID-19 in
prisons and other places of detention: Internal Guidance’
<http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-and-controlof-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf>.
2
Ibid.
3
Solidarity Across Borders (24 March 2020) ‘Communiqué from prisoners in the Laval Immigration
Holding Centre: Hunger-strike until we are free’ <www.solidarityacrossborders.org/en/communiquefrom-prisoners-in-the-laval-immigration-holding-centre-hunger-strike-until-we-are-free>. For a copy of
the petition, see: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1a6mUOnLCQp0P9P7perYSXEtQkzH2E8Bv/view
4
Ibid.
5
Human Rights Watch (7 April 2020) ‘Immigration Detainees in Canada Desperate for Release,
Transparency’
<www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/07/immigration-detainees-canada-desperate-releasetransparency>.
6
Ibid.
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detainees are held in provincial prisons where they are double-bunked and herded into
prison canteens on a daily basis with hundreds of other inmates who are serving
criminal sentences or awaiting trial.
A severe outbreak of COVID-19 at a medium security federal correctional
facility in British Columbia in April 2020 brought the risks posed by COVID-19 into
stark relief, by demosntrating the rapidity with which the virus spreads within
confinement facilities.7 Chief Public Health Officer Dr. Theresa Tam warned that
infections in correctional facilities were “very concerning” because of their potential
to spread fast, with “grave consequences” for those vulnerable populations.8 Public
Safety Minister Bill Blair instructed the leadership of the Correctional Service of
Canada and the Parole Board of Canada to develop early release mechanisms so as to
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on prison populations.9 According to Canada Border
Services Agency (CBSA) data, the total number of immigration detainees in Canada
dropped by more than half, from 333 to 127, between 15 March 2020 and 28 April
2020.10
Despite the seriousness of the pandemic, immigration detainees had limited
options through which to advocate for their own release. The legal framework requires
detainees to seek release in the course of regularly scheduled detention review hearings
before the Immigration Division (ID) of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the
independent, quasi-judicial administrative tribunal tasked with detention-related
decision-making in Canada. But the review hearings are in many ways rigged against
detainees. The ID hearings are structured such that detainees face a myriad of barriers
to effective participation, including ineffective active adjudication by ID members, the
failure of decisionmakers to decide afresh at each hearing, rigid interpretive practice,
and a rushed, perfunctory process (IRB 2018, [7, 11-17, 19-23, 26-30, 37]). Most
significantly for our analysis here, the ID has very limited jurisdiction to consider the
location or conditions of detention (Canada v Chhina 2019, [57]; Toure v Canada
2018, [72]; Brown v Canada 2017, [138]). In the result, detainees are effectively
precluded from raising concerns where conditions of confinement pose a threat to their
safety or wellbeing. With the onset of the pandemic, therefore, advocates were
7

CBC News (3 May 2020) ‘B.C. rally calls for safe release of prisoners due to COVID-19 outbreak’
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/b-c-rally-calls-for-safe-release-of-prisoners-due-to-covid19-outbreak-1.5554114>.
8
CBC News (31 March 2020) ‘Bill Blair asks prison, parole heads to consider releasing some inmates
to stop spread of COVID-19’ <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/prison-covid19-csc-release1.5516065>.
9
ibid.
10
CTV News (1 May 2020) ‘Number of immigration detainees drops by more than half amid COVID19 spread’ www.ctvnews.ca/politics/number-of-immigration-detainees-drops-by-more-than-half-amidcovid-19-spread-1.4921203. In a detention review hearing that took place on 12 May 2020, a CBSA
representative noted that the Agency was “minimizing detentions and releasing where suitable
alternatives exist because of this health crisis”, though “continuing to seek the detention of those who
pose a risk to the Canadian public” (infra note 29, Decision J at 23); see also Global News (25 April 25
2020) ‘Canada is releasing immigration detainees at ‘unprecedented’ rates amid COVID-19 fears’ <
https://globalnews.ca/news/6861756/canada-releasing-immigration-detainees-coronavirus-covid-19/>,
where a CBSA representative is quoted in an email to Global News as stating: “CBSA officers are asked
to focus efforts to explore all viable alternatives to detention for all cases, where there is no public safety
concern.”
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concerned that detainees would be unable to seek release on the basis that the
conditions of their detention put them at heighteted risk of COVID-19 infection.
In this chapter, we analyze the initial response of the ID to cases where
immigration detainees sought release, at least in part on the basis of COVID-19, to
better understand Canada’s response to the global pandemic as it relates to immigration
detention. Writing in the four months after pandemic measures were first introduced in
Canada, our analysis is by necessity provisional. We were able to locate a relatively
small sample of ID decisions, numbering seventeen in total, that were released in the
two month period between mid-March and mid-May 2020, at the height of the
pandemic in Canada. All of the decisions were released in Ontario and British
Columbia. Our analysis of this dataset reveals an identifiable shift in ID practice. Prior
to the outbreak of COVID-19, ID members generally refused to hear arguments related
to conditions of detention, and rarely ordered release on that basis. With the onset of
the pandemic, however, ID members have not only entertained arguments identifying
COVID-19 as a condition of detention, but more significantly, have explicitly relied on
this condition as a basis for release. Of the seventeen decisions we analyzed, the ID
recognized COVID-19 as a condition of detention relevant to the release analysis in
sixteen cases.11 In eleven cases, the ID ordered release, at least in part on the basis of
COVID-19.12
This shift in ID practice is significant. Legally, it allows detainees to argue the
conditions of their own confinement before the administrative body tasked with
overseeing their detention. This renders those conditions actionable, and therefore
legally meaningful. Materially, this shift empowers detainees, allowing them to more
effectively advocate for their own release, while lessening the violence inherent to the
detention review process. Conceptually, the decisions suggest a shift in the paradigm
within which legal decisions governing detention are made. Before COVID-19, the
release assessment was firmly entrenched in the familiar “us/them” divide that
characterizes the disciplinarity of immigration detention.13 Underlying many detention
decisions was a basic concern with how best to protect “us”, the Canadian public, from
the ostensible risk posed by “them”, the detainees. With the post COVID-19 shift, the
line between “us” and “them” has blurred, and the location of risk seems to have
temporarily shifted in relation to that line. On the whole, the decisions surveyed here
are more concerned with protecting both the detainee and the public – the newly
formed, newly vulnerable “us” – from the shared risk posed by the virus.

11

See infra note 29, decisions A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P.
See infra note 29, decisions A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, P. Of the remaining five cases, the ID
recognized that release may be possible given a more suitable alternative in three cases, and ordered
release for one detainee in a subsequent hearing. See infra note 29, decisions K, L, M, N, O.
13
Rayner Thwaites has written about the ways in which Canada’s immigration detention regime allows
for lesser legal protections for noncitizens, thereby sacrificing “their” safety for “our” security (Thwaites
2009, 671). In the American context, Juliet Stumpf and Jennifer M. Chacón have written extensively
about the ways in which the othering of migrants has fed into the trend towards the criminalization of
migration, including the use of immigration detention (see Chacón 2014 and Stumpf 2006). In the U.K.,
Bridget Anderson has similarly observed the ways that borders produce immigration status, allowing for
the exclusion of migrants and contributing to the perception of the “illegal” migrant in contrast with the
good citizen (Anderson 2013, [2]-[5]).
12

3
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653452

This shift, however subtle, is indicative of the malleability of risk in the
detention setting. In the face of the pandemic, the previous conception of the inherent
riskiness of migrants was swiftly displaced by the disruptive, and risky, virus– a change
that was surely buttressed by the closure of the Canadian border, in particular to asylum
seekers. The onset of COVID-19 has thus revealed the ways in which the containment
and confinement of noncitizens can be reconfigured in Canadian law, and the
progressive possibilities hidden in that reconfiguration.
Following this introduction, we develop this argument in three parts. In Part
One, we map the legal terrain governing immigration detention in Canada, focusing on
the legal framework governing conditions of detention before the onset of COVID-19,
to discern the particular challenges facing immigration detainees in securing release
from detention on the basis of conditions of confinement. In Part Two, we examine the
above-noted dataset, analyzing how ID members adjudicated requests for release in the
immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. In Part Three, we argue that COVID19 has ushered in a meaningful shift in ID practice. We reflect on the legal, material,
anc conceptual implications of this shift, analyzing what COVID-19 suggests about the
potentially shifting nature of the “us/them” paradigm that underpins Canadian
immigration detention, and where risk is located within that paradigm. Mindful of the
potentially limited nature of this shift, we identify the progressive possibilities hidden
within it, and urge for the current practice to continue even as the threat posed by the
pandemic begins to pass.
Part One: The Legal Terrain Pre-COVID-19
Described by Bosworth as a “volatile and contested” site (Bosworth 2014, [3])
immigration detention can be understood as a collection of practices by which the state
contains and confines non-citizens. Mountz et al conceptualize detention as a “series
of processes” governed by interlacing logics of bordering/exclusion and
mobility/containment (Mountz et al 2013 [524-526]; see also Martin 2015 [234-236]).
In Canada, this logic finds legal expression in the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA), and Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), which
regulate the immigration detention regime. The legislation empowers the Canada
Border Services Agency with almost unfettered discretion to arrest and detain noncitizens.14 It outlines three broad primary grounds for arrest and detention, namely,
where a CBSA officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is inadmissible
to Canada or is a danger to the public (IRPA, s. 33–42.1, 55(2)(a)),15 if they believe the
person is unlikely to appear for removal or for other immigration-related proceedings
(IRPA, s. 55(2)(a)), or if they are not satisfied of the person’s identity (IRPA, s.
55(2)(b)).16 Since the legislation is silent with respect to the location and conditions of
14

The IRPA also allows detention through the “designated foreign nationals” regime, which is outside
the scope of the discussion here (but see Arbel 2015).
15
A foreign national may be inadmissible for human or international rights violations; various forms of
criminality; misrepresentation; failure to comply with any provision of the IRPA; financial, security, or
health reasons; or because a family member is inadmissible.
16
The main factor to be considered is the person’s cooperation in establishing their identity (IRPR, s.
247). The IRPA also permits detention where a CBSA officer has “reasonable grounds to suspect” that
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detention, the CBSA has interpreted their authority as conferring “an unfettered
discretion to detain migrants wherever and however it sees fit.” (Anstis et al, [12])
There are only three dedicated Immigration Holding Centers, or IHCs, in
Canada, one each in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, located
in the Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver areas, respectively.17 When a non-citizen is
arrested, they are subject to the “National Risk Assessment for Detention” (NRAD), an
opaque process by which the CBSA assesses the level of risk posed by the detainee and
decides the most appropriate detention placement.18 Higher risk detainees are placed in
a correctional facility – usually a provincial prison – alongside individuals who are
imprisoned awaiting trial, or who have been convicted and are serving a sentence.
Detainees who score below a certain threshold on the NRAD – and are therefore
designated as low risk – are placed in an IHC, where one is available.19 Migrants who
are detained outside of Ontario, Quebec or British Columbia are detained in a
correctional facility as a matter of course. In such facilities, the civil and criminal
detention apparatuses intertwine most visibly. Non-citizens who are held in
overcrowded provincial prisons endure lamentable conditions, with limited access to
legal counsel, mental health support, and translation services, and are subjected to the
same conditions as those convicted of criminal offences, including double bunking,
lockdowns, restraints, and in some situations, solitary confinement (Anstis et al, [14];
see also Gros et al 2015 and Nakache 2011).
The disciplinary practice of immigration detention is embodied not only in the
physical confinement it prescribes, but also through the complex legal network it
enacts. Under Canadian law, there is no clear time limit on detention; there is only
mandatory, periodic review undertaken by the Immigration Division (ID) of the
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRPA, s. 57). The ID conducts its first review 48
hours after the initial detention decision is made, in order to determine whether the
CBSA has established a basis for detention (IRPA, s. 58), to weigh the factors
enumerated in the regulations, and ultimately to decide whether to continue detention
or order release (IRPR, s. 248). If detention is continued, the detainee has another right
to a hearing after 7 days, and every 30 days subsequent to that, until they are released
or removed from Canada (IRPA, s. 57). What this means is that an individual who has
spent, for example, five years in detention, has undergone at least 60 detention review
hearings – and has been ordered detained at every single one of those hearings.20 These
the foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, or
various forms of criminality (IRPA, s. 55(3)).
17
A fourth facility at the Vancouver airport is only for detentions of 48 hours or less.
18
The NRAD is not disclosed to the detainee who has been subjected to it. If a detainee wants access to
their NRAD, they must obtain it by filing an access to information and privacy request to the CBSA, the
results of which can take months to receive.
19
CBSA’s enforcement manual on detention
(https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf20-deten.pdf) states that: “The IHC should always be the default detention facility if risk can be mitigated, in
regions where those facilities are available. Individuals detained under the IRPA who have scored 0 to
4 points and 5 to 9 points (if risk can be mitigated in an IHC) on the NRAD form [BSF754] should be
held in an IHC.”
20
There are many examples of individuals who have been detained for more than 90 days in Canada:
see Canada Border Services Agency, “Annual Detention Statistics – 2012-2019”
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periodic hearings perform the disciplinary function of detention again and again: the
detainee is nominally reassessed by the state, every 30 days, with the effect of being
punished anew.
The systemic flaws entrenched within the ID review process have been well
documented.21 A recent and scathing audit of the detention review process conducted
by the Immigration and Refugee Board in 2017–2018 revealed a litany of problems,
including inaccuracies and inconsistencies in factual findings, uncritical reliance on
statements by CBSA hearings officers, failure to hear evidence from the enforcement
officer or investigator in appropriate cases, failure to allow detained persons to hear
and present evidence, failure to question the CBSA on delay, barriers to participation
of detained persons in the proceedings, ineffectively active adjudication in considering
alternatives to detention, over-reliance on past decisions, rigid interpretations of
statutory and regulator factors, and lack of consideration of mental health concerns
(IRB 2018, [7, 11-17, 19-23, 26-30, 37]). In addition to the findings in the audit, critics
have also described the review process as insufficiently independent, hurried, pro
forma rather than substantive, ineffective, and perfunctory (Gros et al, [24]; Will 2016,
[46-49]).
The problems with the review procedure are created, in part, by shortcomings
in the legal configuration of detention. By the letter of the legislation, the ID “is not
bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence” and may base its decisions on any
evidence that it considers “credible or trustworthy in the circumstances” (IRPA, s. 173).
Formally, the legislation requires the ID to release a detainee unless one of the statutory
grounds for detention is established (IRPA, s. 58). In evaluating whether release is
warranted, the ID is obligated to consider the factors delineated at section 248 of the
regulations, which include the reasons for detention, length of time in detention,
anticipated length of continued detention, delays or lack of diligence on the part of
immigration officials or the detainee, and the availability of any alternatives to
detention.22 Significantly for our purposes, conditions and location of detention are
conspicuously absent from this list.
<www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/detent/stat-2012-2019eng.html#:~:text=There%20has%20been%20drop%20in,detention%20has%20dropped%20by%2047.5
%25>.
21
A series of court decisions that highlighted the various flaws in the immigration detention decisionmaking process began emerging in approximately 2015. See e.g. Chaudhary v Canada 2015, Toure v
Canada 2018, Ali v Canada 2017, Scotland v Canada (Attorney General), 2017, and Canada v Chhina
2019. In addition, and probably at least partially as a result of those court decisions, Canadian newspaper
outlets began to demonstrate an interest in the topic, and in early 2017, the Toronto Star, a high-profile
Canadian newspaper, published an investigation into Canada’s immigration detention system that
involved interviewing 15 immigration lawyers, all of whom, according to the Star, “criticized the
detention review hearings as procedurally unfair and stacked in the government’s favour.” See: Toronto
Star (16 June 2017) ‘Heated exchange over legal rights as lawyers battle to have refugee claimant let out
of
jail”
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/06/16/heated-exchange-over-legal-rights-aslawyers-battle-to-have-refugee-claimant-let-out-of-jail.html. Also important was the emergence of an
advocacy organization known as the End Immigration Detention Network, which grew out of the wellestablished Canadian migrant rights organization No One Is Illegal (https://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/).
22
Originally developed in Sahin 1995, these factors have been incorporated into the IRPR at section
249. It’s worth noting that ID members are required to consider the s. 248 factors with an eye to ensuring
compliance with s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees to everyone
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Problematically therefore, while the ID is vested with the authority to oversee
detention, it has limited jurisdiction over the location or conditions of that detention.
In 2017, the Federal Court explained in Brown v Canada that ID members are
“constitutionally required to consider the availability, effectiveness and
appropriateness of alternatives to detention ”, but that the “responsibility for the
location and conditions of detention rests with the CBSA or provincial correctional
authorities” (Brown v Canada 2017, [138]). Also in 2017, the Ontario Court of Appeal
held in Toure v Canada that “the location of detention is a proper issue for immigration
detainees to raise with the CBSA” (Toure v Canada 2018, [72]).23 In 2019, the Supreme
Court of Canada stated in Chinna that “the Immigration Division has no explicit power
to examine harsh or illegal conditions”, but left open the possibility that implicit power
on the part of the ID to consider conditions of the detention can be read into the
statutory scheme (Canada v Chhina 2019, [57]). Also in 2019, the Federal Court in
Smith stated that the Minister “agrees that the ID has the jurisdiction to consider and
make findings on Charter violations, and to consider a detainee’s conditions of
detention” (Canada v Smith, 2019 [60]). Since Smith was an interlocutory order in
which the Court made no specific findings in this regard, and since the decision has not
(yet) been cited, Smith’s precedential value is not clear. Nevertheless, Chhina and
Smith, when read together, appear to leave a glimmer of hope for detainees seeking to
render their harsh and disproportionate conditions of confinement legally meaningful
in the context of detention review proceedings before the ID.
While the guidance offered by the courts is mixed, for the most part, ID
members have interpreted these rulings as placing conditions of detention outside their
jurisdiction, and generally refused to hear arguments about conditions in the course of
detention review. As a result, detainees are compelled to raise such concerns through
an internal complaint process with the CBSA, the very agency that has ordered their
detention and set its terms. If such a complaint is dismissed, their only remaining option
is to seek judicial review before the Federal Court, an opaque and procedurally limited
remedy that is beyond the reach of most, and often substantively ineffective.24 CBSA’s
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
23
The full excerpt from the Toure decision is as follows: “Mr. Toure had a mechanism to challenge his
place of detention and to raise the conditions of the CECC with the CBSA. The jurisprudence supports
this as did the Minister’s evidence on the application. The application judge failed to properly consider
this evidence, including that Mr. Toure had not asked the CBSA to transfer locations: see Brown, at para.
38. The location of detention is a proper issue for immigration detainees to raise with the CBSA.
Particularly, if the location of their detention is not consistent with how they fit within the CBSA’s own
criteria. If this query is ignored, this decision is the proper subject of judicial review.”
24
There are several features of the Federal Court judicial review process that make it a problematic
mechanism for protection in the face of deprivations of liberty. In terms of jurisdiction, the powers of
the Federal Court are limited to reviewing the reasonableness of the decision before it, and the Court has
no jurisdiction to hear new evidence. Further, judicial review is discretionary in terms of access, timeline
and remedy. The powers of the Federal Court on judicial review are limited to setting aside the decision
at issue and referring it back for determination “with such directions as it considers to be appropriate,”
a remedy that may not be adequate in the detention context. Moreover, even where the FC finds that the
decision at hand is unreasonable, the issuance of a remedy is also discretionary. See Federal Courts Act,
ss. 18.1(3) and (4), both of which use the permissive language of “may.” See also Mission Institution v
Khela 2014, [41].
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internal complaint procedure and the judicial review process in the Federal Court are
woefully inadequate: costly, slow, inconvenient and ineffective. Those held in
correctional facilities have even fewer options, as the CBSA loses control over
conditions of detention once they transfer a detainee to a provincial jail. 25
Immigration detention is therefore structured such that two different institutions
share carriage over one human body.26 The ID is tasked with overseeing detention and
deciding release, but has only limited jurisdiction to consider the material conditions
of that detention, even if these conditions are oppressive or unlawful. The CBSA, in
contrast, can order detention, set the location and conditions of that detention, and
advocate for its continuation. As an adverse party to the proceedings in detention
review hearings, the CBSA is not sufficiently independent to meaningfully respond to
complaints about the very detention conditions it has authorized or prescribed, but
nevertheless retains jurisdiction over those conditions.
Martin’s analysis of immigration detention’s disciplinarity assists in
understanding the consequences of this configuration. As Martin explains, since
immigration detention cannot be reduced to a single strategy or practice, its
disciplinarity is not manifest only through the fact of confinement (Martin 2015, [234]).
Detention, Martin suggests, is better understood as a “lived process and a bundle of
textual and embodied practices meted out through everyday enactments” (Martin 2015,
[236]; see also Lindley 2019). The mandatory periodic review functions as one such
every day enactment. The legal framework configures the ID as a body that can mete
out de facto punishment, but cannot respond to the material conditions of that
punishment.27 This configuration severs the ID’s capacity to oversee, or otherwise
respond to, the disciplinarity it enforces. It limits the ID’s ability to function effectively
as an independent administrative tribunal, and instead accrues disproportionate power
to the CBSA, the very agency that has ordered the detention and set or authorized its
terms. The effect is fundamentally coercive: this configuration leaves detainees at the
mercy of the CBSA, deprived of meaningful legal recourse through which to challenge
the material conditions of their detention before the body tasked with its oversight. In
the result, this configuration strips detainees of the legal tools to render their lived
experience actionable. As Martin aptly explains, when such strategies are deployed in
the detention context, they operate to further isolate, contain, and exclude detainees.
Assessed from this vantage point, the ID’s reluctance to adjudicate conditions of
detention may be seen as one of detention’s most confining practices: it operates to
disempower detainees, and further isolate them within their already isolated detention.
This configuration causes significant harm to detainees. In their recent study of
Canadian detention, Cleveland et al concluded that the perfunctory and unpredictable
nature of the 30-day review contributes to feelings of helplessness and
25

For analysis see Anstis et al 2017, [fn 41] citing, inter alia, the memorandum of understanding between
the CBSA and the Ontario Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services regarding
Immigration detainees, executed 21 January 2015. In short, even if the Federal Court finds that a
detention placement decision, the criteria for which are not set out anywhere in the relevant legislation,
is unreasonable, the best it can do is send the decision back to the CBSA to be reconsidered.
26
We are indebted to Toby Goldbach for her insights on, and contributions to, this analysis.
27
For an understanding of how the tension between the length and normative conditions of punishment
are understood in prison law, see Kerr 2017.
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disempowerment among detainees (Cleveland et al 2018). The researchers interviewed
81 adults detained in two Canadian detention centers, all of whom were asylum seekers,
and found that immigration detention triggers feelings of powerlessness and loss of
hope, contributing “significantly to post-traumatic stress, depression and anxiety
symptoms” (Cleveland et al 2018, [1005]). They found that the detainees felt a
profound sense of uncertainty and loss of agency while detained, and suffered
significant mental health effects with lasting harm, even when detention was brief and
its conditions adequate (Cleveland et al 2018, [1005]). According to the researchers,
detention’s most adverse impact “appears to be largely attributable to the combined
effect of two factors: symbolic violence and disempowerment” (Cleveland et al 2018,
[1001]. See also Rachel Kronick et al 2011). Detainees, they concluded, felt
“disempowered by the experience of waiting for an indeterminate period for the
outcome of a discretionary decision over which they have little control, but which will
determine their freedom and their future” (Cleveland et al 2018, [1001]). ID review
decisions, the researchers found, were “often perceived as unpredictable, arbitrary,
beyond their control. Hope peaked at each detention review, only to be dashed when
detention was continued.” (Cleveland et al 2018, [1003]). The inability to raise
conditions of detention as a basis for release contributes to such feelings of
disempowerment. In this key respect, the ID’s reluctance to hear submissions about
hostile or unlawful conditions reinforces the violence wrought by detention.
Part Two: The Legal Terrain in the Age of COVID-19
The above summary outlines the legal configuration of immigration detention
in Canada when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. In assessing the broader legal
response to COVID-19 in immigration detention, we now turn to analyze ID decisions
in which COVID-19 was raised as a justification for release. Since ID decisions are not
presumptively publicly available, our sample size is relatively small. We located
seventeen ID decisions where COVID-19 was raised as a factor justifying release,
through either shared Access to Information and Privacy Requests or with the consent
of counsel. This sample represents hearings from only two provinces: eleven of the
hearings were held in Ontario, and six were held in British Columbia. All of the
hearings were conducted via teleconference in the two month period between 26
March, 2020 and 21 May, 2020.28
Based on this dataset, we found that on the whole, the ID has not only
recognized COVID-19 as constituting a “condition of detention” – insofar as COVID19 renders detention more dangerous to the detainee’s health and wellbeing – but has
also willingly incorporated this as a factor into its reasoning. Of the seventeen decisions
we analyzed, the ID explicitly recognized COVID-19 as a condition of detention in
sixteen cases.29 In only one decision, discussed in more detail below, the ID Member
28

We obtained three decisions by way of a Freedom of Information request, as reported in Global News
(25 April 25 2020) ‘Canada is releasing immigration detainees at ‘unprecedented’ rates amid COVID19 fears’ <https://globalnews.ca/news/6861756/canada-releasing-immigration-detainees-coronaviruscovid-19/>, and shared with the authors. We obtained fourteen decisions with the consent of counsel.
29
Decision A: March 30, 2020, Ontario. Decision B: March 26, 2020, Ontario. Decision C: March 30,
2020, Ontario. Decision D: April 22, 2020, British Columbia. Decision E: April 21, 2020, British
Columbia. Decision F: April 24, 2020, 2020, Ontario. Decision G: April 23, 2020, Ontario. Decision H:
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concluded that while COVID-19 was a factor impacting the length of detention, she
could not consider COVID-19 as a condition of detention.30 In eleven of the seventeen
decisions we analyzed, the ID determined that release from detention was warranted at
least in part on the basis of COVID-19, and ordered the detainee released with
conditions. Of the remaining five decisions, in one the detainee was released at a
subsequent review eleven days later, and in four the Member acknowledged that release
may be possible given a more suitable alternative to detention. In the discussion below,
we have designated the decisions by letter in order to anonymize all other identifying
details. We also provide a more complete account of the decisions in the Appendix at
the conclusion of this chapter.
Decision “A”, released soon after pandemic measures were first introduced in
Canada, represents a convenient starting point for analysis. In this decision, the
Member addressed the jurisdictional conundrum posed by the ID’s inability to consider
conditions of detention head on. The case involved a refugee claimant detained at the
Immigration Holding Centre in Toronto on the basis that she was unlikely to appear for
immigration proceedings.31 The individual had been detained for almost two weeks,
and sought release with the Minister’s consent. The Board Member explicitly
acknowledged that while “the Immigration Division does not have control over the
conditions of detention”, these conditions were still a factor to be considered pursuant
to the regulations.32 She then explicitly recognized COVID-19 as a condition to be
factored into the assessment, placing particular emphasis on the fact that a COVID-19
case had been diagnosed in the Holding Center.33 She concluded that the detainee’s
vulnerability to the risk of COVID-19 infection constituted “exceptional
circumstances” that were relevant for consideration and weighed in favour of release.34
Decisions “B”, “C” and “D”, released in March and April 2020, were similarly
decided. In all three, the individual was detained on the grounds that they were unlikely
to appear for immigration proceedings. In decision “B”, the Member was notably
sympathetic to the realities of the pandemic, and stated that “in the midst of a global
pandemic”, any time spent in detention “certainly is difficult.”35 With the consent of
the Minister, the Member agreed to release the individual with the support of a
bondsperson, reasoning that due to COVID-19, “there is no real clear answer of when
you would be removed or could be removed, and to me that favours release”.36 In
Decision “C”, the Member was similarly explicit in her findings, stating that “the

May 4, 2020, Ontario. Decision I: April 3, 2020, Ontario. Decision J: May 12, 2020, British Columbia.
Decision K: April 20, 2020, Ontario. Decision L: April 24, 2020, British Columbia. Decision M: April
23, 2020, British Columbia. Decision N: May 21, 2020, Ontario. Decision O: April 3, 2020, Ontario.
Decision P: April 14, 2020, Ontario. Decision Q: May 4, 2020, Ontario.
30
Decision Q at 14.
31
Decision A.
32
Decision A at 4.
33
Decision A at 5.
34
Decision A at 5.
35
Decision B at 4.
36
Decision B at 3. The Member also factored COVID-19 into her assessment of the reasonableness of
the bond, noting that “the global pandemic would impact an individual’s ability to post a significant
amount of money any more than the $5000 [sic].” Decision A at 4.
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conditions of your detention are something that I am able to consider”.37 The Member
accorded “significant weight to the conditions, given the current COVID-19 pandemic,
which can put your security of the person at risk.”38 In Decision “D”, the Member
reasoned that the “coronavirus is a relevant factor in considering [the detainee’s]
conditions of detention”, and concluded that the alternative accommodation presented
“not only mitigates the flight risk… but also reduces [the detainee’s] risk of exposure
to COVID”, and therefore “weighs in favour of release”. 39
Decisions “E”, “F”, and “G”, also released in March and April 2020, all
involved individuals detained on the grounds that they were unlikely to appear for their
removal from Canada. In each, the Member followed a similar approach: treating
COVID-19 as a condition of detention relevant to the analysis, and requiring that
certain measures be in place to order release. In decision “E”, in reference to the
proposal of a recovery facility as an alternative to detention, the Member reasoned that
“there’s likely a greater degree of risk of transmission” in the larger facility in which
the detainee was held, and this favoured released.40 In decision “F”, the Member placed
significant weight on the fact that COVID-19 had already taken hold in the correctional
facility at issue, which placed the detainee at an elevated risk of infection. As a result,
the Member determined that release on terms and conditions was appropriate.41 In
decision “G”, the Member spoke of COVID-19 in more detail, noting that, though
COVID-19 “is not a factor that is explicitly listed in Regulation 248”, it can
nevertheless “be looked at and assessed as it relates to the conditions of your detention
and the reason for this assessment is to ensure that your detention is in compliance with
the Charter.”42 Unlike in the other decisions we reviewed, however, the Member found
that he did not have sufficient information before him to order release on the basis of
COVID-19.43 Nevertheless, the Board Member determined that the support of a
bondsperson and the Toronto Bail Program were sufficiently robust to offset any flight
risk concerns, and ordered release on that basis.44
The decisions involving individuals detained on the basis that they pose a
danger to the public follow a slightly different analytic trajectory. In these decisions,
each of the ID Members at issue engaged in a balancing exercise, to evaluate whether
the risk posed to society by the detainee was greater than the overall risk posed to public
health. In decision “H”, the Member accepted the detainee’s arguments that he faced a
“higher likelihood of …contracting the virus in the detention facility” due to “the lack
of ability to socially distance and to engage in proper hygiene.”45 The Member went
on to conclude that the alternative to detention proposed – a halfway house – presented
37

Decision C at 3.
Decision C at 3.
39
Decision D at 50-51.
40
Decision E at 42.
41
Decision F at 25 and 27.
42
Decision G at 11
43
Ibid. The information that the Board Member identified as lacking included the steps being taken by
the facility to prevent the spread of the virus, whether the detainee was able to adequately self-isolate,
and what medical resources and services would be available to the detainee at the facility should he
become infected.
44
Ibid at 12.
45
Decision H at 22.
38
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the detainee with a “better ability to exercise some protection against the COVID
virus,”46 and ordered release with conditions. Notably, the primary consideration in this
decision seems to have been the detainee’s safety, and his ability to protect himself
against the shared risk posed by the virus.
In decision “I”, the Member determined that the risk posed by the detainee to
the public was at the “low end of the spectrum” because of the limited sentences he had
received for his convictions, his “stated remorse” and “the fact that there had been no
violence in the commission of any of the offences”.47 The Member further noted that
the length of the detainee’s continued detention was uncertain, as Canada was not
enforcing removals, and his country of origin was not permitting repatriation in light
of COVID-19.48 In weighing the broader risks posed by COVID-19, the Member
reasoned that the precautions taken by the Holding Center at issue were “not perfect”,
and that the individual faced “a high risk of exposure and significant restrictions on
[his] ability to self-isolate”.49 The Member ultimately ordered release. Here, as in
decision H, the Member’s pivot from considering the risk posed by the detainee to the
risk posed to the detainee suggests a malleability in the legal understanding of risk.
In decision “J”, the individual had been detained for over three and one-half
months at Fraser Regional Correctional Centre, and advanced a recovery facility as an
alternative to detention. Relying on a COVID-19-focused prison law decision, the
Member concluded that while the “pandemic is not a get out of jail free card”, it is “a
factor that I need to take into consideration”.50 Clarifying further, the Member stated
that COVID-19 “is an important consideration”, and concluded that the detainee’s
chances of contracting COVID-19 in Fraser Regional were more significant than at the
recovery facility.51 Elsewhere in the decision, the Member again reiterated that “the
situation with respect to COVID” is a factor to consider when deciding release.52
Ultimately, the Member concluded that the “likelihood of [the detainee] contracting
COVID-19”, as well as the risk posed “to the general public in Canada”, nudged the
analysis in favor of release. The shift away from the Member’s prior preoccupation
with the risk posed by the detainee, to his consideration of the broader risk posed by
COVID-19 to the general public, is notable. Like decisions H and I, this decision points
to a marked shift in containment strategy, one that moves away from a concern with
protecting the public from the detainee, towards one that seeks to protect the public by
protecting the detainee. COVID-19 here serves a unique function: by rendering each
and every one of us a potential transmission vector, the virus betrays the fundamental
interconnectedness of self and other, forcing a discernable shift in the ID’s
understanding of risk, public safety, and state responsibility.
46

Ibid.
Decision I at 4.
48
Decision I at 5. As part of its response to COVID-19, CBSA temporarily halted deportations of people
with rejected claims, with the exception of serious criminal cases that continued to be evaluated on a
case by case basis. See: Global News (18 March 2020) ‘Canada hits pause on deportations because of
coronavirus’ https://globalnews.ca/news/6694503/coronavirus-canada-deportations/.
49
Decision I at 6.
50
Decision J at 42.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
47
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Of the decisions where the ID ordered continued detention, the Board Members
engaged in a similar balancing exercise. In five of the six negative decisions, the
Member nonetheless recognized COVID-19 as a condition of detention that warrants
consideration. In decision “K”, the Member acknowledged that jails “may be fertile
ground” for COVID-19 to spread, and that the individual suffered from an underlying
health condition that increased his vulnerability.53 The Member nevertheless noted that
no incidents of COVID-19 had been reported at the correctional center at issue, and
that the risk posed by the detainee to the public in light of his past criminal offences
was greater than the risk posed by the virus.54 Similarly, in decision “L”, the Member
reasoned that since the correctional facility at issue was following the recommended
guidelines, and since the detainee was not at increased risk of infection, COVID-19 did
“not tend to weigh in favour of release in and of itself.”55
In decisions “M” and “N”, the Members found that the release plan proposed
by counsel was insufficient to mitigate the risk to the public posed by the detainee. In
decision “M”, the Member acknowledged that the detainee faced a greater risk of
COVID-19 infection in the correctional facility at issue, but found that since the facility
was “taking significant aggressive measures to prevent and manage any COVID-19
outbreak,”56 and since the detainee posed a “significant risk to the general public”,
continued detention was warranted.57 Ultimately, the Member concluded that since the
detainee had not proposed any alternative to detention, he was unable to evaluate
“whether there would be any significantly lower risk to him upon release.”58 In decision
“N”, the Member noted that, though “the conditions of person’s detention [sic] is not a
factor explicitly listed in regulation 248”, she was “prepared to consider it
nonetheless.”59 She then observed that the detainee had an underlying health condition
that made him more susceptible to the virus, and found “that this factor does weigh
every [sic] so slightly” in favour of release.60 The Member then proceeded to a broader
analysis of the risk posed by the pandemic that was not present in any other decision
we reviewed. The individual had not arranged an alternative to detention, and his
counsel suggested he would be placed in a shelter.61 The Member noted that “there
have been over 300 cases, COVID-19 cases in the shelter system [sic].”62 As a result,
she concluded that release did not mitigate the public health concerns posed by the
pandemic.63 While the Member did not order release, as with decision M, her reasoning
still partakes of the same risk balancing exercise seen in decisions H, I, and J. In both
decisions M and N, the definitive factor guiding the decision to continue detention was
less the risk posed by the detainee, and more the absence of a viable alternative. It is

53

Decision K at 29.
Ibid.
55
Decision L at 19.
56
Ibid.
57
Decision M at 21 and 26.
58
Ibid.
59
Decision N at 18.
60
Ibid at 19.
61
Ibid at 20.
62
Ibid at 21.
63
Ibid at 21.
54
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plausible that with a more robust and developed alternative detention proposal, the
Members would have ordered these particular individuals released.
Indeed, this was what happened in decision “O” and “P”, wherein the Member’s
initial conclusion that continued detention was warranted was later reversed when
counsel presented a more robust alternative. In decision “O”, the Member referred to
COVID-19 as “an extraordinary factor” which must be considered in the release
assessment, and concluded that that “like the [criminal law] judges… I should and can
similarly take notice of the fact that there is a greatly elevated risk posed to detained
inmates from the coronavirus.”64 Ultimately, however, the Member noted that the
detainee had been found by the Parole Board of Canada to “pose an undue risk to
society” in the absence of a mandatory residency requirement, which was not part of
the release plan proposed.65 The Member ordered continued detention on the basis that
the risk posed by the detainee to society was greater than the risk posed to the detainee
by COVID-19. When the same detainee appeared before the ID eleven days later in
decision “P”, the Member ordered release. Once again, the Member found that the
detainee posed a flight risk and an “unacceptable degree of risk to the Canadian public”
because of his criminal history.66 In holding that “the impact of the COVID-19 [sic] in
a detention setting in isolation also strongly tends to favour release from detention”,
the Member noted “the generally accepted presumption that social distancing and
regular hygiene and certain preventive measures have prevented this pandemic from
being even more disastrous than it has been throughout the world.”67 The Member
concluded that the release plan proposed, which consisted of parole supervision by the
Correctional Services of Canada, was sufficient to offset both the danger and flight risk
concerns.68 This reasoning is reminiscent of that deployed in decisions H, I and J: the
perceived threat posed by COVID-19, and the broader risk of transmitting the virus,
supersedes the risk to the public perceived to be posed by the detainee.
Finally, decision “Q” concerned an individual who had been detained for three
days after being released from criminal custody on the ground that he posed both a
danger to the public and a flight risk. This decision is notable in that it is the only one
of the seventeen decisions surveyed where the Member refused to take COVID-19 into
consideration as a condition of detention, stating that, “I am not persuaded that the
Immigration Division has the jurisdiction to consider conditions of detention.”69
Nevertheless, the Member did find that the pandemic would impact the forwardlooking length of detention, a relevant consideration pursuant to the enumerated factors
in the regulations, before concluding that release was not warranted.
While the substantive results reached in each of the cases analyzed above
differs, certain key findings emerge. Most notably, the decisions point to an identifiable
shift in the jurisdictional purview and practice of the ID. While it may be tempting to
conclude that these decisions are anomalies, the Immigration and Refugee Board has
released public statements that suggest otherwise. When interviewed by Global News,
64

Decision O at 5
Decision O at 5.
66
Decision P at 5.
67
Ibid.
68
Decision P at 8.
69
Decision Q at 14.
65
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for example, a spokesperson for the Board stated that it was “open to decision-makers
to consider any relevant factors in determining whether detention is justified, including
COVID-19 and its potential risks to detained individuals.”70 The spokesperson went on
to note that the ID is “entertaining requests from parties for early detention reviews,
for example to consider alternatives where the person detained may have a
vulnerability that places them at elevated risk from the virus or any cases with an
alternative to detention.”71 These very public statements suggest that the decisions
referred to above, far from constituting exceptions, are part and parcel of an approach
to COVID-19 in relation to immigration detention adopted by the upper echelons of
the Immigration and Refugee Board. That the Minister has not yet sought to judicially
review any of these decisions only reinforces this as a likelihood. The ID’s approach
to COVID-19 as a relevant factor in detention decisions reveals the ways in which
containment and confinement can be reconfigured in the law and practice of Canadian
detention.
Part Three: The Ramifications of this New Approach
By framing COVID-19 as a condition of detention that is within its jurisdiction
to review, the ID has ushered in a shift in the disciplinarity of detention. Even if the ID
reverts to its prior practice as the pandemic abates, the decisions surveyed here reveal
progressive possibilities that can benefit the ID review process moving forward. From
the perspective of law, the ID’s apparent willingness to consider conditions of
confinement as a factor relevant to release is significant. Such a shift enables detainees
to bring their lived experience forward before the ID, the administrative body tasked
with overseeing their detention. This has the effect of rendering that lived experience
actionable, justiciable, and legally significant. This shift also helps address some of the
problems associated with having both the ID and CBSA share carriage over one
detainee. The ability to consider conditions of confinement endows the ID with
jurisdictional authority that enhances its independence and capacity for principled
adjudication, and allows it to more effectively discharge its obligations to oversee
detention. This shift also resists accruing undue power to the CBSA, and more
appropriately circumscribes the CBSA’s scope of authority as regards the detainee.
Such a shift also makes space for future legal arguments about the ID’s jurisdiction to
order release on the basis of unsafe conditions or location of detention. If this shift
endures as the pandemic subsides, the jurisdictional breadth it affords the ID will be a
welcome jurisprudential development.
As regards the lived experience of the detainee, the shift is also meaningful. A
legal framework that enables detainees to raise conditions of confinement as relevant
to the assessment of their release is fundamentally empowering. This shift provides
detainees with more agency over their lives. In this way, such a shift helps address
some of the key concerns identified by Cleveland et al in their study of detention: it
helps render the periodic review process less perfunctory, less arbitrary, and therefore
more meaningful. For some detainees, the ID’s apparent willingness to consider
70

Global News (25 April 25 2020) ‘Canada is releasing immigration detainees at ‘unprecedented’ rates
amid COVID-19 fears’ < https://globalnews.ca/news/6861756/canada-releasing-immigration-detaineescoronavirus-covid-19/>
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Ibid.
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conditions of detention may lead to a material improvement in their experience of
confinement. By way of example, in each of the above decisions where release was
ordered, the detainee was transferred to less restrictive, less punitive, and less
dangerous locations to lessen their exposure to COVID-19 infection. While none were
removed entirely from the detention infrastructure – each being subject to a host of
restrictions characteristic of the confinement practices Martin identifies as
quintessential to detention (Martin 2015)72 – each was nonetheless able to shift their
position within that infrastructure in meaningful ways. If ID members continue to
consider conditions of confinement, this shift has the potential to lessen the violence
inherent in the detention review process.
Conceptually, the shift in ID practice also suggests the possibility of a subtle
shift in the paradigm underpinning the detention review process. The law and practice
of Canadian detention has long been steeped in discourse that depicts the non-citizen
as dangerous and risky.73 Both the passage of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act in 2001, and extensive changes to the legislative framework since it came into
effect, have been animated by a broader emphasis on national security concerns in the
face of the supposed danger posed by migration.74 As Dauvergne has aptly explained,
these discourses are infused by, and infusing of, state laws, political strategies, and
global forces that define the ways in which migrants, and migration, are treated and
understood (Dauvergne 2008). Writing in the Australian context, Vogl describes this
as the broader logic of securitization: the “discursive process by which the threats,
misgivings, and dangers facing the state are constructed as a direct consequence of the
‘problem’ of migration.”(Vogl 2015, [116]) In the decisions analyzed here, the
previous conception of the inherent riskiness of migrants has, at least temporarily, been
displaced by the disruptive, risky, pandemic. For this brief moment in time, the threat
posed by the virus seems to have superseded the perceived threat posed by the so-called
dangerous migrant.
The decisions analyzed in this chapter suggest that with the onset of COVID19, the perceived threat posed to the nation is suddenly – and temporarily – embodied
by the virus. Recall decision “J”, in which the decision maker explicitly recognized that
ongoing detention would pose a risk both to the detainee “and the general public in
Canada”.75 Indeed, most of the decisions analyzed above show the ID member
72

Such restrictions seem to be part of the CBSA’s broader approach to COVID-19: recent media reports
suggest that in Ontario and Quebec – the two provinces where the most migrants are detained each year
– CBSA has given some non-citizens the option of release from detention if they agree to wear electronic
ankle monitors, quintessential surveillance practices deployed in and by the criminal law. CTV News
(May 28, 2020) ‘Some migrants now tracked with ankle bracelets as pandemic 'temporary measure'’
<https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/some-migrants-now-tracked-with-ankle-bracelets-as-pandemictemporary-measure-1.4959851>.
73
Multiple theorists have identified the largely post-9/11 discursive, rhetorical, and political shifts
towards the perception of migrants as “risky” and “dangerous.” See e.g. Anderson 2013; Pratt 2005;
Macklin 2001.
74
See e.g. Daniels, R.J., Macklem, P. and Roach, K. (eds), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s
Anti-Terrorism Bill, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
75
“The risk to him of that as well as the risk to the general public in Canada arising from that factor
would be greater if he remains at Fraser Regional Correctional Centre than it would if he resides at [the
recovery facility]” (Decision J).
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explicitly balancing competing risks – that posed by the detainee versus that posed by
the virus – and ordering release in the name of protecting public health. This suggests
that the previously familiar “us/them” paradigm may have shifted: the line
distinguishing us from them seems to have blurred in the shadow of a common threat.
Rather unexpectedly, therefore, COVID-19 revealed that the risk posed to migrants is
legally meaningful and demanding of the ID’s consideration.
Does this suggest a broader recognition from the ID that immigration detainees were
never all that risky in the first place? Given that discourses depicting migrants as
dangerous still shape the legal and institutional frameworks that govern ID practice,
that is probably too much to hope for. But it does reveal that the legal understanding of
risk and responsibility is never fixed, and in the appropriate circumstances, can be
recalibrated. It may well be that as the worst of the pandemic passes, these decisions
will be confined to their very particular circumstances. Moving forward, Board
Members might treat COVID-19 as exceptional and be reluctant to entertain the
possibility of release on the basis of conditions of confinement. Nevertheless, COVID19 may have caused the ID to reconsider the parameters of its jurisdiction as regards
conditions of detention, even if only in limited circumstances. Given the new decisionmaking norms established by the COVID-19 cases, it will be harder for ID Members
to refuse to hear arguments about conditions of confinement – as in the pre-COVID19 cases, or as in decision Q. The decisions surveyed here may have forged a new path
in ID decision making, one that allows detainees the opportunity to raise arguments
about the conditions of their confinement and compels ID members, and by implication
also the Minister, to engage with these arguments in some way. In this way, COVID19 may have rather inadvertently opened up new possibilities in the law and practice
of immigration detention.
Conclusion
Whether COVID-19 will have a long-term impact on the way immigration
detention is understood in Canada remains to be seen. One thing will certainly change
as Canada gradually exits the worst of the pandemic period: international borders will
gradually start to reopen. Canada will again be faced with migrants traversing its
borders, seeking protection from persecution and other forms of mistreatment. When
this happens, ID decisionmakers will no longer be operating in a context that was, at
least in one significant way, rendered virtually static. With the Canadian border closed
as a pandemic measure, the broader goals of border control were achieved in ways that
were not possible before the onset of COVID-19. Ordering the release of immigration
detainees may have seemed politically possible for a brief moment because the
hardening of the border had been achieved. As Bosworth and Turnbull explain,
immigration detention does not merely serve the goal of containing migrants, it also
serves “broader state aims of regulating and casting out unwanted others” (Bosworth
and Turnbull, [51]). The closed border has made it easier to reconfigure how the
“unwanted others” among us are regulated and confined. A softer approach to a
conception of the “us” within those borders may have felt, for an elusive moment,
achievable.
Whether the softer approach to the conception of “us” will remain possible once
the Canadian border becomes porous again remains unclear. But the broader benefits
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of the ID’s post COVID-19 approach to detention review compels considering why it
shouldn’t be. For now, COVID-19 has ushered in a shift in Canadian bordering
practices and detention strategies that reflects more nuanced understanding of risk and
responsibility, us and them, self and other. This is, perhaps, the sort of different
expression of the “us/them” paradigm that Dauvergne has so persuasively called for
(Dauvergne 2016). The broader benefits of expanding the ID’s jurisdiction to consider
conditions of detention as a basis for release are not specific to the COVID-19
pandemic, and one can hope that they will outlive the current crisis. Perhaps the global
crisis can usher in the kind of paradigmatic change previously deemed impossible. At
the very least, the shift in the ID’s approach to detention reviews should challenge law
and policy makers to consider the progressive possibilities revealed by COVID-1976.
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DESIGNATION
OF DECISION

DATE

LOCATION

LENGTH OF
DETENTION

GROUND(S) for
DETENTION

OUTCOME

A

March 30

2 weeks

Unlikely to appear

Release

B

March 26

Immigration Holding
Centre, Ontario
Ontario

Approximately nine days

Unlikely to appear

Release

C

March 30

Toronto

11 days

Unlikely to appear

Release

D

Apr 22

7 months and 22 days

Unlikely to appear

Release

E

Apr 21

3 months

Unlikely to appear

Release

F

Apr 24

3 days

Unlikely to appear

Release

G

Apr 23

2.5 months

Unlikely to appear

Release

H

May 4

3 days

Danger to the public
Unlikely to appear

Release

I

Apr 3

10 weeks

May 12

Danger to the public
Unlikely to appear
Danger to the public
Unlikely to appear

Release

J
K

Apr 20

3 days

Danger to public
Flight risk

No release

L

Apr 24

Approximately eight
months

Danger to public
Unlikely to appear

No release

M

Apr 23

Approximately two days

Danger to public

No release

N

May 21

Fraser Regional
Correctional Centre,
British Columbia
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Immigration Holding
Centre, Ontario
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Immigration Holding
Centre, Ontario
Fraser Regional
Correctional Centre,
British Columbia
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Fraser Regional
Correctional Centre,
British Columbia
Fraser Regional
Correctional Centre,
British Columbia
Maplehurst Correctional
Complex, Ontario

5 weeks

Unlikely to appear

No release

O

Apr 3

4 days

Danger to public
Flight risk

No release

P

Apr 14

15 days

Danger to public
Flight risk

Release

Q

May 4

Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario
Central East
Correctional Centre,
Ontario

3 days

Danger to public
Unlikely to appear

No release

3.5 months

Release
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